The only solution is to get a baseline that is truly independent of hypnosis, a feature that is rare in this body of research. That is, differences in responses to hypnotic suggestions may be an artifact of differences in expectations related to self-perceptions of hypnotizability. They invented a way of convincing insusceptible subjects that they were, in fact, hypnotizable Slotnick and London, Most people wonder just how well they have been responding to the suggestions that are given The fact is that your performance earlier indicated clearly, in some of its significant details, that you would be an excellent subject for the purposes of the experiment we are doing now.
Because you are a good subject, we want you to participate in the hypnotic phase of this experiment. Somewhat surprisingly, under these conditions insusceptible subjects showed greater improvements following hypnotic suggestion than hypnotizable subjects. London and Fuhrer found the highest scores for both dynamometer strength and weight endurance among insusceptible subjects given exhortations for enhanced performance, regardless of whether these exhortations were delivered in hypnosis.
Other investigations confirmed the basic finding that hypnosis did not improve performance over appropriately motivated nonhypnotic conditions Evans and Orne, ; Rosenhan and London, ; Slotnick and London, , indicating that "hypnosis, as such, adds nothing magical to performance" London and Fuhrer, Publication of these experiments essentially ended this line of research. Nevertheless, a follow-up experiment by Slotnick et al. In this experiment, highly hypnotizable subjects were asked to lift a 2.
In one condition, the subjects were given exhortations for maximal performance, similar to those used by London and Fuhrer. In the other condition, they were given the same exhortation followed by "involving" instructions, in which the subjects were asked to imagine themselves becoming "stronger and more capable.
Although the Slotnick et al. That is, the key to hypnotic enhancement of human performance may lie not in the ability of hypnotic suggestions to passively augment performance, but rather in the interaction of involving suggestions to interact with the capacity for absorption and imagining characteristics of hypnotizable individuals. In the absence of a definitive study, however, the conclusion about the hypnotic enhancement of muscular performance must be negative: hypnotized subjects, even those who are highly hypnotizable, do not appear to be capable of exceeding the performance of highly motivated unhypnotized subjects.
And even if the Slotnick et al. A history similar to that for strength and endurance can be given for studies of the effects of hypnosis on learning capacity. This line of research received some impetus from the reports of many nineteenth-century authorities that mesmerized or hypnotized subjects gave evidence of transcending of normal capacity: changes ranging from increases in verbal fluency and physical strength to clairvoyance.
Nevertheless, an early study by Gray answered the question only weakly in the affirmative: a small group of poor spellers improved their spelling ability somewhat when the learning occurred in hypnosis. Similarly, Sears reported that subjects who learned Morse code in hypnosis made fewer errors than those whose learning took place under nonhypnotic conditions.
More dramatic results were reported in a series of studies by Cooper and his associates, using hypnotic time distortion and hallucinated practice. Subjects were asked to hallucinate engaging in some activity, and at its conclusion were given suggestions that a long interval had passed e.
The idea was that this expansion of subjective time would effectively increase the amount of study, or practice, that could be performed per unit of objective time. Cooper and Erickson , reported, for example, that hallucinated practice led to marked improvement in a subject's ability to play the violin. A more systematic study by Cooper and Rodgin , concerned with the learning of nonsense syllables, also had positive results.
Unfortunately, there were no statistical tests of the. Even so, the effects of hypnotic time distortion and hallucinated practice were seen only on the immediate test: the superiority of hypnosis virtually disappeared at retest, 24 hours later. Another study, by Cooper and Tuthill , found no objective improvements in handwriting with hallucinated practice in time distortion, even though the subjects generally perceived themselves as having improved.
More recent experiments also yielded negative results T. Barber and Calverley, a; Edmonston and Erbeck, In contrast, Krauss et al. Unfortunately, R. Johnson and Wagstaff and Ovenden failed to replicate those results: in fact, their subjects did worse under time distortion than in control conditions. In the most comprehensive study to date, St. Jean repeated the essential features of the Krauss et al.
Although highly hypnotizable subjects reported that they experienced distortions of the passage of time, as suggested, there were no effects on learning.
The combination of time distortion and hallucinated practice is ingenious, but of course it makes some assumptions that are not necessarily valid. First, can mental practice substitute for actual physical practice? There is in fact considerable evidence for this proposition Feltz and Landers, , and since hypnotic hallucinations are closely related to mental images, there is no reason to think that hallucinated practice might not also be effective. But time distortion is another matter: the assumption is that the hallucination of something is the same as the thing itself, and there is no reason or evidence for this assumption.
In fact, such an assumption flies in the face of a wealth of research on hypnotic hallucinations, which shows that they are inadequate substitutes for the actual stimulus state of affairs Sutcliffe, , ; Kihlstrom and Hoyt, Thus, while hypnosis, and hypnotic suggestion, can produce distortions in time perception just as they can produce other distortions in subjective experience, these distortions do not necessarily have consequences for learning and memory St.
Jean, A rather different approach to the question has been taken by investigators who have offered subjects direct suggestions for improved learning, without reference to time distortion or hallucinated practice e. Unfortunately, interpretation of such studies is difficult because of the same methodological problems encountered in the studies of muscular strength and endurance. For example, the induction of hypnosis might merely increase the motivation of subjects to engage in the experimental task, independent of any effects of hypnosis per se.
As in the studies of strength and endurance, some of the problems have been addressed by studies using the paradigm invented by London and Fuhrer , in which hypnotizable subjects are compared with objectively insusceptible subjects who have been persuaded that they are responsive to hypnosis.
As noted above, studies of muscular performance using the unadorned London-Fuhrer design have generally found that when subjects are given hypnotic exhortations for enhancement, hypnotizable subjects and insusceptible subjects who believe that they are hypnotizable perform the same.
Measures of rote learning show similar results Evans and Orne, ; London et al. Thus, the available evidence suggests that hypnotic suggestions do not enhance the learning process. However, most of these studies have used a hypnotic induction based on suggestions for relaxation and sleep, which might interfere with both motor performance and learning.
Relaxation is not necessary for hypnosis, however Banyai and Hilgard, , and it remains possible that different results would be obtained if the suggestions were for an active, alert form of hypnosis. Moreover, suggestions that capitalize on a hypnotized subject's capacity for imaginative involvement may prove to be better than mere exhortations Slotnick et al.
In sum, the question of the possibility of hypnotic enhancement of learning and performance is not closed. Exactly the same considerations apply to studies of the effects of hypnosis on sensory-perceptual acuity for example, word-recognition thresholds that apply to learning. The question is whether these changes in subjective experience reflect actual changes in objective performance in tasks involving sensory detection and discrimination, that is, whether a true hyperesthesia can be induced by means of hypnosis.
Early authorities, such as Braid and Bramwell , concluded that this was possible: Bergson even reported that a hypnotized boy could read, out of the cornea of a man standing in front of him, the letters on a page that the man was holding behind the boy's head. Beside such dramatic claims, the results of formal research have been much less positive.
Again, the earliest investigator in this area was Young , who investigated changes in tactile pressure sensitivity: despite suggestions. In a follow-up study, Young found no effect of hypnosis on the ability to detect subtle differences among postage stamps.
Sterling and Miller likewise failed to find differences in figure-recognition and visual and auditory detection attributable to hypnosis. Zamansky and his associates revived interest in the question and developed special procedures to evaluate order effects driven by expectancies generated by the comparison of hypnotic and nonhypnotic conditions. In their first study Scharf and Zamansky, , these investigators obtained a significant reduction in sensory thresholds for subjects who received hypnotic suggestions and a smaller reduction for subjects who received waking suggestions.
Detailed analysis and postexperimental interviews led these investigators to speculate that the subjects, expecting to be hypnotized on subsequent trials, may have artificially elevated their thresholds on baseline tests.
To test this possibility, they replicated tests but did not inform the subjects about the hypnotic test until after the baseline test had been completed. Under these circumstances, baseline thresholds were high in both hypnotic and control conditions: postexperimental interviews indicated that subjects expected to be hypnotized in both conditions because they could not distinguish between hypnotic and control baselines and elevated their pretest thresholds accordingly.
A later study, with even more careful manipulation of subjects' expectations, showed that baseline thresholds were higher when subjects expected to be subsequently hypnotized Zamansky et al. The Zamansky-Scharf studies underscore the difficulty in performing valid comparisons between hypnotic and nonhypnotic conditions: subjects are capable of modulating their nonhypnotic performance in such a way as to leave considerable room for improvement in hypnosis.
This possibility cannot be controlled by conventional counterbalancing; it can only be eliminated by the very difficult strategy of keeping subjects ignorant of the hypnotic tests until baseline testing has been completed. Obviously, holding back on nonhypnotic baselines is a possibility in the studies of strength, endurance, and learning reviewed above. The fact that the nonhypnotic tests may have been unrepresentative of subjects' true nonhypnotic capacity only accentuates the need for caution in interpreting the few positive results obtained in those studies.
This is an area that cries out for application of modern signal-detection theory Green and Swets, ; Pastore and Scheirer, because of the distinction that approach makes between actual sensitivity and decision criterion. Studies using classical psychophysical techniques for threshold-determination are not able to discriminate between changes in sensitivity and changes in response criterion.
Consider, for example, subjects in Young's study, who are asked to indicate whether they have been touched by. Increased sensitivity is indicated by an increase in detection of the weak stimulus. But subjects who wished to appear highly sensitive could simply indicate that they felt the stimulus on each trial. Such subjects would show a high rate of "hits," appearing to detect the stimulus each time it was presented; however, they would also show a high rate of "false alarms," indicating that they felt the stimulus even on "catch trials" when it had not in fact been applied.
Signal-detection theory takes account of both hits and false alarms and produces a estimate of a subject's sensitivity that is uninfluenced by the subject's response criterion. In one portion of a larger experiment focusing on hypnotic deafness which, as an ostensible impairment of human performance, is beyond the scope of this volume , Jones and Spanos gave subjects suggestions for increased auditory acuity.
There was also a change in response bias, with hypnotizable but not insusceptible subjects showing an increased bias toward reporting that the signal was present, even when it was not. Although hypnosis does not appear to enhance the performance of people whose sensory and perceptual abilities are intact, it may have positive effects on those whose capacities are impaired.
The task was to determine the orientation of the break in a series of 19 rows of "Landolt Cs": from the top row to the bottom, the size of the break in the letter "C" progressively diminished.
After threshold determination, subjects were hypnotized and given suggestions to relax their eye muscles in order to permit clearer vision; they were also given the same suggestions posthypnotically. Over a period of 3 weeks, the subjects' visual acuity increased, both in and out of hypnosis, as confirmed by independent optometric examination; the extent of improvement was greater than that observed in nonhypnotized controls.
A follow-up study showed that the improvements were only observed in highly hypnotizable subjects: measurements with a laser scintillation technique indicated that the improvements were not a function of accommodation or other structural changes in the eyes. A conceptual replication of this experiment was reported by E. Sheehan et al. The hypnotic subjects showed a significant improvement on the signal-detection measure of accuracy, but no change in response bias, in comparison with the waking controls.
However, there was no correlation between improvement and hypnotizability. Although Wagstaff questioned their statistical analysis, Smith et al.
In addition, a secondary analysis by Tataryn showed that the improvement in acuity corresponded to a fairly substantial experimental effect. A rather large research literature exists on hypnosis and the perception of time.
Unfortunately, Bramwell neglected to make the same request of unhypnotized controls, and it is not at all clear that individuals of normal intelligence are incapable of carrying out the elementary arithmetic operations involved. In any event, these early claims have not been upheld by more formal experiments. Some experiments in this area involve intentional, prospective procedures in which subjects are instructed to perform some response after the passage of a specified interval of time. In one such experiment, Stalnaker and Richardson found no differences between hypnotic and control intervals in the estimation of intervals of one to three minutes.
Sterling and Miller also found no effect, but Eysenck reported greater accuracy in hypnosis for a review of the early literature, see Loomis, 1. More recently, Tebecis and Provins found that the prospective estimations of hypnotizable subjects were no more accurate in hypnosis than in the normal waking state.
Overall, the experimental literature, which is somewhat sparse, has yielded a mix of results that tend to support negative conclusions for a recent review, see St. Another procedure, more recently introduced, involves incidental, retrospective time estimation: without any warning, subjects are asked to estimate how much time has passed since an event specified by the experimenter.
With this approach, Schwartz , and Bowers ; Bowers and Brenneman, found a general tendency of subjects to retrospectively underestimate the length of time that they had been hypnotized, but this tendency was independent of hypnotizability.
A series of studies by St. Jean St. Jean and MacLeod, ; St. Jean and Robertson, ; St. Jean et al. Of course, time is not a sensory modality like vision or audition. Although the passage of time can be measured objectively, there is no proximal stimulus for time, and no receptor organs that can extract information about the duration of the interval between two events. Ultimately, time perception is a matter of judgment and inference, and its underlying mechanisms remain largely unknown Doob, ; Fraisse, ; Gibbon and Allan, ; Ornstein, The most prominent question investigated is whether hypnotic suggestion can enhance the memories of witnesses and victims of crime, but essentially the same question can be asked about the prospects for improving memory ''bandwidth" in other applied situations.
For a complete review, see Kihlstrom and Barnhardt, , on which this section is based. Laboratory studies of hypnotic hypermnesia have a history that extends back to the beginnings of the modern period of hypnosis research for recent reviews, see Erdelyi, ; Kihlstrom and Barnhardt, ; Smith, For example, Young , taught his subjects lists of nonsense syllables in the normal waking state and then tested recall in and out of hypnosis, each time motivating subjects for maximal recall.
There was no advantage of hypnosis over the waking test. Later experiments with nonsense syllables also failed to find any effect of hypnosis, although studies that used meaningful linguistic or pictorial material have sometimes shown hypermnesia effects. For example, Stalnaker and Riddle tested college students on their recollections for prose passages and verse that had been committed to memory at least 1 year previously and found that hypnotic suggestions for hypermnesia produced a significant enhancement over waking recall.
Although this kind of laboratory. Moreover, it is fairly clear that any gains obtained during hypnosis are not attributable to hypnosis per se, but rather to hypermnesia effects of the sort that occur in the normal waking state. At least four investigations Nogrady et al. Most important, it seems clear that increases in valid memory or "hit rate" may be accompanied by an equivalent or greater increase in confabulations and false recollections "false alarms".
In an experiment by Stalnaker and Riddle , for example, hypnosis produced a substantial increase in confabulation over the normal waking state, so that overall memory accuracy was very poor.
These conclusions are supported by more recent experiments by Dywan ; Dywan and Bowers, and Nogrady et al. Whitehouse et al. Dywan and Bowers have suggested that hypnosis impairs the process of reality monitoring, so that hypnotized subjects are more likely to confuse imagination with perception M.
Johnson and Raye, Proponents of forensic hypnosis often discount these sorts of findings on the ground that they are obtained in sterile, laboratory investigations that bear little resemblance to the real-world circumstances in which hypnosis is actually used; but the evidence supporting this assertion is quite weak. Reiser , a police department psychologist who has trained many investigators in hypnosis, claimed that the vast majority of investigators who tried hypnosis found it to be helpful, but such testimonials cannot substitute for actual evidence.
In fact, a study by Timm , in which police officers themselves were witnesses to a mock crime after having been relieved of their firearms through a ruse! A later study by Geiselman et al. In sum, the available evidence does not indicate that hypnosis has any privileged status as a technique for enhancing memory. In evaluating the effects of hypnosis on the recovery of forgotten memories, it is important to remember that hypnosis entails enhanced responsiveness to suggestion.
Therefore, if memory is tainted by leading questions and other suggestive influences, as Loftus's work suggests, these elements may be even more likely to be incorporated into memories that have been refreshed by hypnosis.
Putnam exposed subjects to a variant of Loftus's paradigm, in which subjects viewed a videotape of a traffic accident followed by an interrogation that included leading questions. Those subjects who were interviewed while they were hypnotized were more likely to incorporate the misleading postevent information into their memory reports see also Sanders and Simmons, ; Zelig and Beidelman, Register and Kihlstrom , using a variant of Loftus's procedure introduced by Gudjonsson , failed to find that hypnosis increased interrogative suggestibility, but did find that errors introduced during the hypnotic test did carry over to subsequent nonhypnotic tests.
An extensive and complex series of studies by Sheehan and his colleagues reviewed by P. Laurence and Perry suggested to a group of hypnotized subjects that on a particular night they had awakened to a noise. After hypnosis, a majority of subjects remembered the suggested event as if it had actually occurred; almost half of the subjects maintained this belief even when told that the event had been suggested to them by the hypnotist.
Similar results have been obtained by a number of investigators, although the precise conditions under which the pseudomemory effect can be obtained remain obscure.
Direct suggestions for hypermnesia are often accompanied by suggestions for age regression: that the subject reverts to an earlier period in his or her own life, relive an event, and act in a manner characteristic of that age for recent reviews, see Kihlstrom and Barnhardt, ; Nash, More dramatic findings were obtained by Fromm in a nisei student.
In contrast, experimental studies have found no convincing evidence favoring the reinstatement of childlike modes of mental functioning, whether these are defined in terms of physiological responses e. Nash also found that age regression does not necessarily revive specific childhood memories.
It may, however, reinstate childlike modes of emotional functioning. A third component of age regression, revivification, is conceptually similar to the recovery of memory in hypermnesia. In fact, Young was able to elicit a substantial number of early recollections, whose accuracy was independently verified, in two hypnotizable subjects. And more recently, Hofling et al. Unfortunately, neither of these experiments examined false recollections that may have been produced by the subjects.
The obvious difficulty in obtaining independent verification effectively prevents many more studies of this sort from being done in order to understand better the conditions under which these improvements in memory might be obtained. In the absence of independent confirmation, it should be understood that the apparent enhancement of memory occurring as a result of hypnosis may be illusory.
But even independent confirmation does not guarantee that hypnosis itself is responsible for the appearance of revivification: the enhancement of memory may come from general world knowledge or cues provided by the experimenter, rather than improved access to trace information. The salient cautionary tale is provided by True , who reported that age-regressed subjects were able to identify at better than chance levels the day of the week on which their birthdays, and Christmas, fell in their 4th, 7th, and 10th years.
But the experimenter in question knew the answers to the questions as they were asked: when the experimenter is kept blind to the correct answer, response levels fall to chance O'Connell et al. In general, when the testing environment is controlled in such a manner as to eliminate potentially informative cues, there is no evidence that age regression can enhance memory for past experiences.
There is often an experience of increased memory but like so much else about hypnosis, the experience is illusory. But sleep lab data reveal that people consistently underreport how often and how much. The reason is that dreams are ephemeral. Memory for dreams is very limited and largely restricted to the period before awakening.
The only way to remember a dream is to immediately recall it on waking and then write it down or describe it to another person. Only then does its content become encoded in memory.
Although we often have trouble remembering dreams, our dreaming selves have full access to our pasts. In dreams we recall earlier episodes from our lives, and we often experience intense feelings of sadness, fear, anxiety or joy. Perhaps it was this heightened emotionality that led Sigmund Freud to speculate that dreams serve as wish fulfillment. Regardless, the answer to my second question—how and why does the brain manufacture dreams?
But psychologists and brain scientists have recently renewed their interest in this everyday surreal activity. These fast, low-voltage brain waves resemble the ones that occur during wakefulness. This state became known as rapid eye movement REM sleep, to distinguish it from deep sleep. When people are woken from REM sleep, they usually report vivid dreams. Such reports do not occur when people are roused from non-REM sleep. Thus arose the close association between REM sleep and the oneiric state.
For many years experts associated dream consciousness with the distinct physiology of the brain during REM sleep. But in the past several decades that understanding has begun to slowly shift. In the early phases of deep sleep, and during short daytime naps, which consist of pure non-REM sleep, people report vivid hallucinations that are shorter, more static and more thoughtlike than the dreams that occur during REM sleep.
Before going to sleep, the participant and the researcher agree on a specific eye movement for example two movements left then two movements right that participants make to signal that they are lucid.
By using this approach, studies have found that the shift from non-lucid to lucid REM sleep is associated with an increased activity of the frontal areas of the brain. A follow-up study found that electrically stimulating these areas caused an increase in the degree of lucidity experienced during a dream.
Another study more accurately specified the brain regions involved in lucid dreams, and found increased activity in regions such as the pre-frontal cortex and the precuneus. These brain areas are associated with higher cognitive abilities such as self-referential processing and a sense of agency — again supporting the view that lucid dreaming is a hybrid state of consciousness.
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